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AND COACHES ACCOUNTABLE FOR
WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF NCAA RULES
The role of intercollegiate athletics at major colleges and universities
has undergone a dramatic change since the inception of the National
Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") in 1906.1 Amateur athletics
have become a very big commercial enterprise. Each year, collegiate
athletics generates millions of dollars in revenue for universities.' The
NCAA negotiates billion dollar television contracts, conducts national
championships, and markets many products bearing its name For ex-
ample, the Columbia Broadcasting System ("CBS") recently agreed to
pay the NCAA six billion dollars over an eleven-year period for the ex-
clusive rights to the Division I Men's Basketball Championship.4
This increased commercialism has led the NCAA and its member in-
stitutions to a very difficult balancing act between maintaining academic
integrity and amateurism, while striving to generate large revenues in
order to operate a self-financing athletic department. Many coaches,
politicians, and journalists argue that the NCAA and its member institu-
tions are exploiting the student-athlete in order to generate large
amounts of revenue.5 However, many of these same commentators do
not want to hold student-athletes accountable for their own willful viola-
tions of NCAA rules and regulations.
Despite what many individuals believe, most NCAA Division I ath-
letic programs actually lose money.6 Membership in Division I requires
a college or university to sponsor at least fourteen varsity sports, most of
which do not generate revenue.7 Thus, when a student-athlete know-
ingly or willfully violates NCAA rules and regulations, it may not only
1. The History of the NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/history.html (last visited Mar. 25,
2000).
2. Kyle Parks, Marketing Madness Series: The Final Four: St. Petersburg, ST. PETERSBURG
TirmaFs, Mar. 28, 1999, at lB.
3. Stephen M. Schott, Give Them What They Deserve: Compensating the Student-Athlete
for Participating in Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 SPORTS L. J. 25, 31 (1996).
4. The NCAA News, NCAA, CBS Reach 11-year $6 Billion Agreement, http:l/
www.ncaa.orglnews/19991206/active/3625nOl.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2000).
5. Abby Haight, Bringing the Future Into Focus, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Mar. 31, 2000,
at C7.
6. Jeffrey Selingo, In College Sports, Is Bigger Better?, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Oct.
31, 1997 at A55.
7. Id.
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jeopardize the student-athlete's eligibility, but it may also subject the
university to costly NCAA investigations and sanctions.8 Recent exam-
ples of academic fraud, gambling scandals, and prohibited contact with
sports agents, have caused great harm to universities' reputations and
economic standings, while the offending athlete walked away
unscathed. 9
This article argues that student-athletes are adults and should be held
accountable for their willful disregard of long-established NCAA rules
and regulations. Schools invest significant time and money into student-
athletes in the form of recruiting, scholarships, uniforms, equipment, and
travel." The university must have a means of protecting its investment
from athletes who have no regard for established rules and coaches with
a win-at-all-costs attitude. However, the question remains as to the best
method with which to hold coaches and student-athletes accountable for
violating rules that cause the university to be exposed to NCAA
penalties.
The analysis is set forth in six parts. Part I explains how coaches and
athletes blatantly violate established NCAA rules for their own benefit
at the expense of the university. Part II discusses the legal relationship
embodied in the contractual relationship between the student-athlete
and the university in the National Letter of Intent, the Financial Aid
Agreement, and the Student-Athlete Statement. Part III will examine
any valid legal claims a university may have against a student-athlete
through its contractual relationship. Part IV will examine if it is in the
university's best interest to pursue a legal claim against a student-athlete.
Part V will discuss the drafting of coaches' contracts and recommend
possible changes in the structuring of the contract in order to hold
coaches accountable for their involvement in violations. Part VI will
explore alternative ways a university can protect its reputation and eco-
nomic interest. This section will examine possible non-legal solutions
along with any consequences that may accompany these
recommendations.
8. Anita M. Moorman & Mary A. Hums, Potential Student-Athlete Liability for NCAA
Violations: Can They or Should They Be Held Legally Accountable?, 9 J. LEGAL ASPECTS OF
SPoRT 163, 164 (1999).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 163.
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I. THE PROBLEM
Much has been written recently concerning the unethical conduct of
student-athletes, coaches, and sports agents." Recent examples of stu-
dent-athletes receiving extra benefits from sports agents, or boosters and
coaches establishing a system of academic fraud to maintain athlete eligi-
bility, have had a detrimental impact on unsuspecting universities. 2
However, little has been done to hold coaches and athletes accountable
for their role in these actions.'3
The cost of the University of Minnesota's investigation into academic
fraud in men's basketball was almost $1.9 million.' 4 Not taken into ac-
count in this total was the $1.5 million buyout of former coach Clem
Haskins' contract or the cost of hiring a replacement coach.' 5 Further-
more, the NCAA has yet to impose penalties upon the university for the
cheating scandal, which may include financial sanctions.' 6
The scandal also caused harm to the university's reputation. 7 Ac-
cording to Representative Peggy Leppik, Chairwoman of the Higher Ed-
ucation Finance Committee in Minnesota, '[t]here is no doubt that
significant harm has been done to the university's reputation in the eyes
of both the public and the Legislature."' Although the investigation im-
plicated Haskins' involvement in the scandal, he received a $1.5 million
buyout and escaped accountability for his role.19 In addition, at least
eighteen former men's basketball student-athletes escaped accountabil-
ity, leaving the athletic department with the difficult task of paying the
bill.20
11. LSU Wins Appeal, Can Participate in SEC Tournament, USA TODAY, Mar. 1, 1999, at
14C; Curt Rallo, A 'Black Eye' For Boilermakers: Purdue to Appeal NCAA Penalties to Bas-
ketball Program, SoUTH BEND TRm., July 1, 1999, at Bi.
12. Mark Asher, Irish are Assessed Penalties; Probation a First for Notre Dame, WASH.
POST, Dec. 18, 1999, at D1; Jay Weiner, Haskins' Sweet Deal Leaves Sour Taste: The New
Findings About the Coach's Role Have Some Wondering Why He Was Able to Leave with $1.5
Million, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis), Nov. 20, 1999 at Al; Porter Admits Taking Money From
Agent, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Feb. 29, 2000 at Cl.
13. Moorman & Hums, supra note 8, at 169.
14. Mary Jane Smetanka, U Inquiry Costs Nearly $2.2 Million: The Total is Higher than
Expected, but the NCAA is Pleased with the Report's Thoroughness, STAR TRiB. (Minneapo-
lis), Feb. 24, 2000, at lA.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. A Sample Of Reaction to the U Story, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis), Nov. 20, 1999, at
12A.
18. Id.
19. Weiner, supra note 12, at Al.
20. Smetanka, supra note 14, at IA.
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Another example of an athlete causing economic harm to a univer-
sity was Marcus Camby's involvement with sports agents.2 ' Camby, who
admitted receiving cash and expensive jewelry from sports agents, sub-
jected the University of Massachusetts to NCAA violations.2 2 The Uni-
versity of Massachusetts was stripped of its 1996 regional championship
and forced to return $151,000.00 in tournament money.23 However,
Camby escaped accountability.24 In 1996, Camby signed a three-year, $8
million contract after being selected as the second overall draft pick by
the Toronto Raptors.1 Subsequently, Camby signed a six-year, $40 mil-
lion contract with the New York Knicks.2 6
The above examples are only two of numerous examples of coaches
and student-athletes escaping accountability while the university suffers
harm to its reputation and to its wallet. Moreover, unethical conduct of
student-athletes and coaches is not going to disappear. In an atmos-
phere populated by players craving money, gamblers looking for a
chance to get rich, and unscrupulous agents looking to secure future cli-
ents, problems will continue to persist.
II. LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STUDENT-ATHLETE AND
THE UNIVERSITY
In order to understand the legal relationship between the student-
athlete and the university, it is important to examine their contractual
relationship.27 Traditional contract doctrine can function to hold stu-
dent-athletes accountable for their willful violations of NCAA rules and
regulations. This accountability begins by recognizing the reasonable
obligations placed on student-athletes that arise from the contractual re-
lationship between a student-athlete and the university.
A. Overview of Modern Cases
Many cases have examined the potential contractual relationship be-
tween a student-athlete and a university in situations where student-ath-
21. Joe Burris, Would-be Agent Suing Camby, B. GLOBE, Feb. 18, 1999, at D3.
22. Id.
23. Reports Name Vegas Lawyer in Auburn Eligibility Scandal, USA TODAY, Mar. 13,
2000, at 10E.
24. Moorman & Hums, supra note 8, at 164.
25. Id.; Reports Name Vegas Lawyer in Auburn Eligibility Scandal, supra note 23, at 10E.
26. Shawna Richer, Knicks' Camby Marvels at Raptors' New Digs: Knick Forward Reflects
on the Turmoil of His Lasts Days in Toronto, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Mar. 22, 1999, at
S3.
27. Michael J. Cozzillio, The Athletic Scholarship and the College National Letter of Intent:
A Contract by Any Other Name, 35 WAYNE L. REv. 1275, 1283-84 (1989).
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letes alleged a breach of contract by their university.28 Although these
suits were brought by student-athletes, a similar analysis can be used to
examine a possible claim brought by a university. In analyzing the rela-
tionship, many courts have acknowledged that the university-student re-
lationship is contractual in nature, especially when financial aid is a part
of the agreement. 9
Taylor v. Wake Forest University represented "the first major court
decision to hold that a contract exists between the student-athlete and
the university."3 In Taylor, a student-athlete football player alleged that
the university wrongfully terminated his scholarship after he refused to
participate in team practices due to his poor academic performance.3'
"Taylor's grade point average at the end of his first semester of his fresh-
man year was 1.0 on a 4.0 scale."' 32 As a result of his low grade point
average, Taylor was ineligible to play football during the spring semester
of his freshman year.33 However, after improving his grade point aver-
age enough to regain his athletic eligibility, Taylor refused to participate
in football during his sophomore year.34 The university then terminated
Taylor's scholarship, citing his failure to comply with his contractual obli-
gations.35 Taylor continued to attend Wake Forest University and
sought to recover the $5,500.00 he would have incurred during the last
two years of college.36
The trial court granted summary judgment for Wake Forest Univer-
sity and the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed.37 Affirming the
trial court's grant of summary judgment, the appellate court stated that
Taylor failed to comply with his contractual obligations. The appellate
court stated:
As long as his grade average equaled or exceeded the require-
ments of Wake Forest, he was maintaining his scholastic eligibility
28. Moorman & Hums, supra note 8, at 165.
29. Id.; Cozzillio, supra note 27, at 1283-84.
30. Daniel Nestel, Athletic Scholarships: An Imbalance of Power Between the University
and the Student-Athlete, 53 OHIo ST. L. J. 1401, 1403 (1992).
31. Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379, 381 (N.C. App. 1972), cert. denied, 192
S.E.2d 197 (N.C. 1992)
32. Timothy Davis, An Absence of Good Faith: Defining a University's Educational Obli-
gation to Student-Athletes, 28 Hous. L. REv. 743, 770 (1991).
33. Id. Wake Forest University required a 1.35 GPA after the first year, a 1.65 after the
second year, and a 1.85 after the third year.
34. Id.
35. Id.; Nestel, supra note 30, at 1403.
36. Robert N. Davis, The Courts and Athletic Scholarships, 67 N.D. L. REv. 163, 175
(1991).
37. Id.
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for athletics... When he refused to do so in the absence of any
injury or excuse other than to devote more time to studies, he was
not complying with his contractual obligations.38
A second prominent case that discussed the contractual relationship
between a student-athlete and a university is Begley v. Corporation of
Mercer University.39 In Begley, a student-athlete brought a breach of
contract claim against the university for revoking his scholarship when it
discovered his high school grades did not meet the NCAA require-
ments. 40 The court granted Mercer University summary judgment, stat-
ing that Begley's grades violated a provision in the scholarship
agreement.4' More significantly, the court reaffirmed the belief that an
athletic scholarship created a contractual relationship between the ath-
lete and university.42
Finally, a third and more recent decision implies that a court would
not have any difficulty in viewing a scholarship agreement as an enforce-
able binding contract. 43 In Ross v. Creighton University, the student-ath-
lete claimed that the university failed to properly educate him.44 The
court concluded that it was impossible to enforce a claim that the univer-
sity failed to provide 'adequate' educational services because a court was
incapable of determining the quality of education.45 Although this case
did not directly address whether the scholarship was a contract, the court
concluded that the relationship between the university and a student-
athlete is, in part, contractual.46 Furthermore, the court concluded, "[a]
contract between a private institution and a student confers duties upon
both parties which cannot be arbitrarily disregarded and may be judi-
cially enforced. 47
The decisions in Taylor, Begley, and Ross have consistently used a
contractual analysis to define the parties' respective rights and responsi-
bilities to resolve disputes.48 The Taylor and Begley decisions endorse
the proposition that the athletic scholarship creates a contractual rela-
38. Taylor, 191 S.E.2d at 382.
39. 367 F. Supp 908 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
40. Nestel, supra note 30, at 1403.
41. Id. at 1403-04.
42. Id. at 1404.
43. Davis, supra note 36, at 191-92.
44. 957 F.2d 410, 412 (7Th Cir. 1992).
45. Davis, supra note 36, at 191-92.
46. Ross, 957 F.2d at 413.
47. Id. at 416 (quoting DeMarco v. University Health Sciences, 352 N.E.2d 356, 361-62
(1976)).
48. Moorman & Hums, supra note 8, at 165.
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tionship between the university and the student-athlete. 49 Therefore, a
university may try to use contract analysis as a mechanism to hold a stu-
dent-athlete accountable when he or she willfully violates NCAA rules
and regulations.
B. Elements of the Contractual Relationship
The essential elements of a contract are straightforward." In its sim-
plest terms, the formation of a contract requires an offer, acceptance,
and consideration.5 ' These same basic elements can be used to examine
the more complex contractual relationship between the student-athlete
and the university.
There are numerous documents containing statements that may po-
tentially form a contract between the student-athlete and the univer-
sity.52 The primary documents that may establish a contractual
relationship between the student-athlete and the university are the Na-
tional Letter of Intent, the Financial Aid Agreement, and the Student-
Athlete Statement. 3 In order to understand the contractual relationship
these documents may create, it is important to understand the role each
plays.
The National Letter of Intent program is administered by the Col-
legiate Commissioners Association. 4 The purpose of the National Let-
ter of Intent program is to provide certainty in the recruiting process.5
Participating institutions agree to provide a prospective student-athlete,
who is admitted to the university and is eligible for financial aid under
NCAA rules, athletic aid for one academic year in exchange for the
prospect's agreement to attend the university for that academic year. 6
In addition, participating universities agree to not recruit any prospec-
tive student-athlete who has signed a National Letter of Intent with an-
other university.57
Under the National Letter of Intent program, the university's athletic
director sends a written offer to the prospective student-athlete, offering
49. Nestel, supra note 30, at 1404.
50. Davis, supra note 36, at 165.
51. Id.
52. Moorman & Hums, supra note 8, at 165.
53. Cozzillio, supra note 27, at 1290-91.
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a "scholarship in exchange for the student-athlete's commitment to at-
tend the institution and participate in intercollegiate athletics.""8 The
National Letter of Intent must first be executed by the school's athletic
director or authorized representative and, then, by the prospective stu-
dent-athlete and the student's parent.59 After executing the National
Letter of Intent, the prospective student-athlete is committed to the uni-
versity, generally, but not to a particular program.6" In addition, the pro-
spective student-athlete is only allowed to sign one National Letter of
Intent.6'
The National Letter of Intent contains a penalty if the prospective
student-athlete does not attend the named institution, but rather attends
another participating university.62 The penalty is that the student-athlete
cannot represent another institution in intercollegiate athletics competi-
tion until the student-athlete has completed two full academic years at
the other institution.63 Further, the student-athlete is charged with the
loss of two seasons of athletics eligibility in all sports.64 However, the
student-athlete can receive a qualified release from the original univer-
sity, thereby losing only one season of eligibility.65 Additionally, there
are several actions that nullify the National Letter of Intent.66 A few
activities that nullify the National Letter of Intent include: active duty in
the armed forces for eighteen months, failure to attend any university for
a year, and if the student-athlete's sport is discontinued at the institution
named on the Letter.67
The second important document is the Financial Aid Agreement.
Before signing the National Letter of Intent, the student-athlete must
have the Financial Aid Agreement in his/her possession.6 The Financial
Aid Agreement is the offer from the university to pay for the student-
athlete's tuition, fees, room, board, and books.69 The wording of the
Financial Aid Agreement is at the discretion of each individual univer-
58. Cozzillio, supra note 27, at 1290.







66. Cozzillio, supra note 27, at 1291-92.
67. Id. at 1292; National Letter of Intent, supra note 54, at http://www.national-letter.org.
68. Derek Quinn Johnson, Educating Misguided Student Athletes: An Application of Con-
tract Theory, 85 COLuM. L.REv. 96, 115 (1985).
69. Davis, supra note 32, at 772.
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sity.7 ° Typically, the Financial Aid Agreement contains a list of the
terms and conditions of the award, as well as the amount and duration.71
These terms and conditions require the student-athlete to comply with
institution, conference, and NCAA rules.72 Furthermore, the student-
athlete promises to remain academically eligible and to participate in the
institution's athletic program.73 The Financial Aid Agreement is renewa-
ble on an annual basis, for a maximum of five years.74 However, the
university may withdraw the award if the student-athlete fails to comply
with the conditions set forth the agreement.75
The third material document is the Student-Athlete Statement. Prior
to a student-athlete being able to compete each year, he/she must sign
the Student-Athlete Statement.76 The athletic director or a designee ad-
ministers the Student-Athlete Statement.77 The Statement verifies that
to the best of the student-athlete's knowledge, the athletic department's
conduct, as well as their own actions, are in compliance with the appro-
priate NCAA, conference, and university rules.78 The Student-Athlete
Statement includes a summary of NCAA regulations regarding the stu-
dent-athlete's eligibility, recruitment, financial aid, and amateur status.79
Finally, the Student-Athlete Statement demands that a student-athlete
consent to drug testing." If the student-athlete refuses to sign the Stu-
dent-Athlete Statement, they are ineligible to participate in NCAA
competition.8'
The National Letter of Intent, the Financial Aid Agreement, and the
Student-Athlete Statement, taken together, are an "express contract that
specifically delineates the student-athlete's contractual obligations."'82
The language of these documents clearly indicates that the relationship
between the university and a student-athlete is more than an "academic
gift."83 These documents contain promises that provide consideration
70. Johnson, supra note 68, at 115.
71. Davis, supra note 32, at 771-72.
72. Davis, supra note 36, at 166.
73. Davis, supra note 32, at 772.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. STUDENT-ATHLrE STATEMENT - DMVISION I, NCAA, ACADEMIC YEAR 1998-99.
77. The University of Tennessee at Martin Department of Intercollegiate Athletics, available
at http://vww.utm.edu/-danellef/compliance.html (visited Mar. 25, 2000).
78. Id.
79. Student-Athlete Statement, supra note 78.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Davis, supra note 32, at 771-73.
83. Davis, supra note 36, at 165.
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
for the agreement.84 The student-athlete, in prior possession of the Fi-
nancial Aid Agreement, promises to attend a university when he signs a
National Letter of Intent.85 In exchange for this commitment, the uni-
versity promises to provide the student financial assistance.86 In its sim-
plest terms, the relationship between the university and a student-athlete
satisfies the requirements of offer, acceptance, and consideration.
C. Contract Formation
In order to form the contract between the student-athlete and the
university, it is essential that there is mutual assent and that the parties
intend to be legally bound to the agreement.87 The key issue is whether
each party to the agreement manifests an intent to be legally bound by
their promises.88 Intent is an important element in the contract forma-
tion because the entire transaction may be aborted if either party, ex-
pressly or implicitly, manifests intent not to be bound by their apparent
promises.8 9 A contract will not be enforced if the parties intend not to
be bound or held legally accountable for failure to satisfy their
promises. 9° Thus, further analysis is necessary to examine the intent of
the student-athlete when entering into a contractual agreement with a
university.
The student-athlete's intent is measured by a reasonable person's in-
terpretation of the other party's representation. 91 The recruiting process
by which a prospective student-athlete receives a National Letter of In-
tent offer reflects the serious nature of the prospect's intent to be bound
by the agreement. Recruiting is an aggressive process where prospective
student-athletes compete for scholarships and athletic departments
spend millions of dollars traveling the country scouting athletic talent.92
Another factor used in determining whether the parties manifested
their intent to be bound by the contract is if the document is sufficiently
definite and certain to permit a court to apply an appropriate remedy.93
Here, the National Letter of Intent reflects a final, formal document that
84. Davis, supra note 32, at 771.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Cozzillio, supra note 27, at 1293.
88. Id. at 1294.
89. Id. at 1293.
90. Id. at 1294.
91. Id.
92. Kimberly Sweet, U. Nebraska: University Funding Essence of Athletic Success, Ne-
braska Staff Says, U-WiRn, Jan. 24, 2000.
93. GORDON D. SCHABER & CLAUDE D. ROHWER, CoNTRACS, 1, 12 (3d ed. 1990).
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is a reflection of the parties' desire to engage in a comprehensive agree-
ment.94 The National Letter of Intent, along with the Financial Aid
Agreement and the Student-Athlete Statement, represent all the mate-
rial terms of the agreement, leaving no room for judicial 'gap-filling.' 95
Therefore, these documents stand as a clear reflection of the student-
athlete's serious intent to be bound by their commitment to the univer-
sity in exchange for the financial aid.
D. Potential Problems
Even though it appears that a contract exists between student-athletes
and universities, it could be argued that the agreement represents an
adhesion contract.96 The NCAA rules prescribe that member institu-
tions administer documents that are uniform.9 7 For example, Article
3.2.4.5 of the NCAA Constitution states that the Student-Athlete State-
ment "shall [be] administer[ed] annually, on a form prescribed by the
Management Council." 98 Adhesion contracts are contracts that are of-
fered as "take-it-or-leave-it" propositions.99 General contract law indi-
cates that adhesion contracts are looked at with disfavor when there is a
gross inequity in bargaining power between parties to the contract. 100
However, many courts have held that adhesion contracts are enforceable
absent a finding of unfairness or unconscionability. 1° 1 Assuming an indi-
vidual voluntarily enters into a standardized contract (i.e., not procured
by fraud or unconscionability), courts will not invalidate the contract and
will uphold the doctrine of freedom of contract.' 2
Although student-athletes are recruited by numerous universities
and retain a considerable power to choose what university to attend, the
contract documents at each university are the same.10 3 However, the
student-athlete does not agree to any specific clauses that are so shock-
94. Cozzillio, supra note 27, at 1305.
95. Id. at 1305-06.
96. Mark A. Conrad, Letters of Intent and Scholarships, Sport Law for Sport Managers, in
SPORT LAWv FOR SPORT MANAGERS 218, 227 (eds. Doyice J. Cotton & T. Jesse Wilde, 1997).
97. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AssOCIATION, 2000-01 NCAA DMSION I MAN-
UAL, art. 3.2.4.5 & art. 13.02.9 (2000).
98. Id.
99. James V. Jordan & Judith B. Gitterman, Franchise Agreements: Contracts of Adhe-
sion?, 16 SuM. FRANCHSE L. J., 1, 1 (1996).
100. Conrad, supra note 96, at 227.
101. Jordan & Gitterman, supra note 99, at 1.
102. Jonathan E. Breckenbridge, Bargaining Unfairness and Agreements to Arbitrate: Ju-
dicial and Legislative Application of Contract Defenses to Arbitration Agreements, 1991 ANN.
SuRv. AM. L. 925, 956 (1993).
103. Id.
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ingly unfair that a court would decide against enforcement. Requiring
student-athletes to maintain a minimum level of academic standing, not
accept extra benefits from sports agents to restrain from using illegal
drugs, and to avoid gambling on intercollegiate athletic competition are
not unconscionable expectations. Furthermore, prospective student-ath-
letes have alternatives to intercollegiate athletics.104 An increasing num-
ber of prospective student-athletes are skipping collegiate athletics
altogether, choosing to turn professional after high school.'05 Thus, ap-
plying the concept of adhesion contracts to the student-athlete/university
relationship may be difficult.
A second potential problem in the contractual agreement between
student-athletes and universities is the possible incapacity of the athlete
to enter into a binding contract. 10 6 Since most prospective student-ath-
letes sign the National Letter of Intent during their senior year of high
school, it is possible that they will only be seventeen and are therefore
considered a minor in most jurisdictions.0 7 Thus, the question arises if
the contract becomes voidable due to the student-athlete's lack of
capacity. 0 8
The National Letter of Intent requires that an adult party (i.e., parent
or guardian) co-sign with the student-athlete in an attempt to ensure that
the agreement will be enforceable. 0 9 Generally, an adult co-signer is
liable for damages when a minor breaches the contract." 0 The use of
the co-signature by an adult allows the National Letter of Intent to exist
as a viable contract even though the student-athlete may still be under
the age of majority."' In addition, most student-athletes will reach the
age of majority when they attend the university and will then implicitly
or expressly ratify the agreement, removing the capacity problem."'
Furthermore, the Student-Athlete Statement, which contains many key
promises, is not signed until the student-athlete has enrolled at the insti-
tution and, most likely, has reached the age of majority.
104. College Basketball Notebook, Tm COUR1ER-J. (Louisville), June 13, 1999, at 11C.
105. Id.
106. Cozzillio, supra note 27, at 1325.
107. Id.
108. Conrad, supra note 96, at 228; see also, Cozzillio, supra note 27, at 1326.
109. Id. at 226.
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III. THE UNWERsITY'S CLAIM
Since a breach of contract action is available to the university, it is
important to analyze what type of claim the university could bring
against the student-athlete."' When a party who owes a duty under the
contract fails to perform that duty, that party has breached the con-
tract. 4 The basic remedy for a breach of contract action involves the
awarding of damages to compensate the injured party. 15
In their contract with the university, student-athletes make several
specific promises. Included in the Letter of Intent, Financial Aid Agree-
ment, and the Student-Athlete Statement are specific clauses where the
student-athlete promises to abide by NCAA, conference, and institution
rules. The Student-Athlete Statement incorporates Articles 10 (Ethical
Conduct), 12 (Amateurism), 13 (Recruiting), 14 (Eligibility), 15 (Finan-
cial Aid), and 16 (Awards and Benefits) into the agreement.116 For ex-
ample, Bylaw 12.3 of the NCAA Division I Manual is included in the
Student-Athlete Statement." 7 The Bylaw states that student-athletes
are not eligible for a sport if they have ever accepted money, transporta-
tion, or other benefits from an agent or agreed to have an agent market
the student-athlete's athletic ability or reputation in that sport.1 8 This
rule, barring athletes from receiving extra benefits has been in existence
for at least fifteen years, and student-athletes are well aware of its
existence. 1 9
Consider a situation where a high profile student-athlete accepts ex-
tra benefits (i.e., money, gifts) from a sports agent placing the unsuspect-
ing university at risk for NCAA violations, financial penalties, and
investigative costs. After a lengthy investigation, the university incurs
several NCAA penalties, including the return of revenues generated
from NCAA Championship competition. Subsequently, the student-ath-
lete who violated NCAA rules has become a professional athlete ac-
cepting a multi-million dollar contract. This scenario could lead a
university to bring a contract action against its former student-athlete.
The university could bring a breach of contract action for monetary dam-
ages to recover for the economic harm incurred, and more importantly,
113. Moorman & Hums, supra note 8, at 166.
114. Frank J. Cavico, Jr., Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract - A Principled Ap-
proach, 22 ST. MARY'S L. J. 357, 361 (1990).
115. Id. at 363.
116. Student-Athlete Statement, supra note 76.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Tom D'Angelo, Miller Cleared by UF, PALM BEACH Posr, Mar. 31, 2000, at 1C.
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to establish a precedent of holding student-athletes accountable for their
willful misconduct. However, some state statutes bar claims against stu-
dent-athletes for violations of collegiate athletic association rules.120 In
Texas, a cause of action cannot be brought by a regional athletic associa-
tion if, at the time of the violation, the defendant was a student at a
member institution of the regional athletic association.'
Additionally, a student may raise an antitrust defense to a breach of
contract claim. Over the last thirty years, student-athletes have brought
several suits challenging the draft, agent, and compensation bylaws as
violations of antitrust law.' "Courts have rejected all of these chal-
lenges."' 3 Courts have deferred to the NCAA's rules and principles of
amateurism and have concluded that such rules fail to constitute unlaw-
ful restraints of trade. 24 Thus, based on the existing precedent, it is un-
likely that an antitrust defense would be successful.
The university could also bring a claim based on fraud due to the
intentional misrepresentations made by a student-athlete. Fraud in the
inducement claim relates to false representations made prior to the in-
ception of the contract.'2 It occurs when a party to a contract is induced
to enter into that contract by the fraud of the other party.126 Because
fraud neglects the essential element of meeting of the minds, the de-
frauded party has the right to void the contract and/or seek damages. 2 7
A student-athlete may fraudulently represent his eligibility to the
university when signing the student-athlete statement each year prior to
competition. In this situation, the university would have to show that the
student-athlete knowingly made a false representation of a material fact
to the university that the institution relied upon to its damage. 28 Since
the contract documents contain specific clauses that relate to student-
athlete eligibility, particularly in regard to their involvement with agents,
120. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 131.003 & 131.005 (1999).
121. Id.
122. Sherman Act Invalidation of the NCAA Amateurism Rules, 105 HARiv. L. REV. 1299,
1302 (1992).
123. Id.
124. Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models and Conflicting Realities,
25 RUTGERs L. J. 269, 310 (1994).
125. Thomas M. Giesler, Jr., Proof of Fraudulent Inducement of a Contract and Entitle-
ment to Remedies, 48 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 329, 338 (Mary G. Leary et al. eds., 1998).
126. Id. at 338-39.
127. 66 Am. JUR. 2d Release § 21 (1973).
128. MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, THE LAW OF FRAuD AND THE PROCEDURE PERTAINING TO
THE REDRESS THEREOF 3 (1981).
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the university could file a claim based on fraud to recover damages for
economic harm.
Damages from fraud may not be predicated on speculation and must
be a proximate consequence of the fraud. 2 9 Generally, damages for
fraud are in an amount that will compensate the plaintiff for the loss
caused by the fraud.'"0 In a situation where an athlete receives extra
benefits from a sports agent, a university should not have any difficulty
showing that their economic harm was the proximate consequence of the
student-athlete's fraudulent representation. Thus, the university should
be able to recover damages to offset its financial injury.
IV. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF UNIVERSITY LEGAL ACTION
While a valid contract claim is probably available to a university, the
question remains whether it is the most practical solution to the prob-
lem. In theory, pursuing a contract action against a former or current
student-athlete sounds like a good idea. However, there are numerous
ramifications that may occur if a university brings suit against a student-
athlete.
If a university takes legal action against a student-athlete who has
caused harm to its reputation and economic status, it could have a nega-
tive effect on the university's reputation.' 31 Recently, universities have
received a substantial amount of criticism due to low graduation rates
and the perceived exploitation of student-athletes. 32 Universities con-
tinue to claim that their primary interest is the education of student-
athletes, rather than winning championships and generating revenue.
33
Universities assert that intercollegiate athletics is an incidental and
subordinate activity to the essential task of providing a quality educa-
tion.'34 Legal action against a student-athlete could make a philosophi-
cal statement that universities are more concerned with operating a
business than educating their student-athletes. 35 Therefore, it is con-
129. Fraud, 19A Ill. Law and Prac., Fraud §9 (1991).
130. Id. at §61.
131. Moorman & Hums, supra note 8, at 169.
132. Rob Oller, Buckeyes Bottom Out In Diplomas, THE CoLumBus DIsPATCH, Nov. 14,
1999, at IA; Jim Donaldson, Graduation Rates Are NCAAs Top Farce, TIMms-PIcAYuNE (New
Orleans), Feb. 20, 2000, at C9.
133. Johnson, supra note 68, at 106.
134. Id.
135. Moorman & Hums, supra note 8, at 170-71.
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ceivable to expect a negative media and public reaction to a university
suing a student-athlete. 136
This negative reaction to university legal action could also have a
negative effect on fundraising. 37 While success in athletics obviously
makes institutions' fundraising efforts easier, legal action against stu-
dent-athletes could have the opposite effect. Alumni and other donors
may be less inclined to donate money to a university whose interests may
seem to conflict with that of their mission.' 38
Another potential consequence of university legal action is the detri-
mental effect it may have on future recruiting. Today, the Internet has a
major impact on the recruiting of prospective student-athletes. 139 High
school recruits are well informed about the universities who are recruit-
ing them. 14 Trying to convince a prospective student to attend a univer-
sity that has previously brought suit against a student-athlete would be a
difficult obstacle to overcome.' 4'
Finally, using the legal system to hold student-athletes accountable
for their action would be extremely costly. 4 2 Retaining a private law
firm to handle the university's case would be very expensive. 43 Due to
escalating court costs and legal fees, compounded with the long delays
that result from overcrowded court dockets, the use of the legal system
may not be very cost effective.' 44 Furthering the problem is the fact that
many student-athletes come from impoverished backgrounds and proba-
bly would not be able to pay the damages the university was awarded. 45
V. CONTRACTUAL ANALYSIS OF A COACH'S RELATIONSHIP TO
A UNIVERSITY
The problem with individuals disregarding NCAA rules is not limited
to student-athletes and agents. Coaches with a win-at-all-costs attitude
place their own career above the future of the university, often leading
136. Id. at 171.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Steve Eighinger, The Internet is Changing High School Athletics Too, ST. Louis
POsT-DISPATCH, Oct. 4, 1999, at 13.
140. Moorman & Hums, supra note 8, at 172.
141. Id. at 172.
142. Id. at 173.
143. Id.
144. Kathleen A. Devine, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Policies, Participation, and Pro-
posals, 11 REv. LITIG. 83, 88 (1991).
145. Hal Bock, Report: Two-thirds of Athletes Break NCAA Rules, STATE TiMEs/MoRN-
ING ADVOC. (Baton Rouge), Nov. 9, 1996, at 2D.
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to NCAA penalties.'46 Coaches' contracts have escalated in value with
several college football and basketball coaches making more than one
million dollars. 47 However, regardless of the pressure placed on coaches
by fans, alumni, and boosters, this type of conduct is inexcusable for a
coach who knowingly disregards NCAA rules. 4
The contractual relationship between a coach and a university is
much simpler than that of a student-athlete. Coaches' contracts, like
many employment agreements, contain the usual clauses identifying the
nature, duration, and compensation to be paid.'49 However, one impor-
tant aspect of coaches' contracts is the inclusion of university, confer-
ence, and NCAA rules. 5 ° The contract of Clem Haskins, the former
University of Minnesota men's basketball coach who was involved in the
university's recent academic fraud scandal, included the following com-
pliance responsibilities:
Section 1.4 Compliance. Throughout the term of this Agree-
ment, Haskins shall comply with the current and hereafter en-
acted or promulgated laws, policies, rules and regulations of and
governing the University and its employees and the current and
hereafter enacted or promulgated constitution, bylaws, and rules
and regulations of the National Collegiate Athletic Association
("NCAA"), the Big Ten Conference ("Big Ten"), and any other
conference or organization with which the University becomes as-
sociated or which affects MICA (collectively, the "Governing As-
sociation"). Haskins shall attempt to have all assistant men's
basketball coaches and any other University employees for whom
Haskins is administratively responsible comply with the foregoing
laws, policies, rules and regulations.' 51
Accordingly, if a coach violates any rule governing recruiting or player
eligibility, the coach may not only be subject to NCAA penalties, but
also to a possible breach of contract action by the university.' 52
Coaches' contracts will almost always contain some type of "termina-
tion for just cause" provision. 53 The just cause provision allows the uni-
146. Johnson, supra note 68, at 107.
147. Michael S. Selvaggi, The College v. The Coach, 3 SEToN HALL J. SPORT L. 221, 224-
25 (1993).
148. Id. at 225.
149. Id.
150. Martin J. Greenberg, College Coaching Contracts: A Practical Perspective, 1 MARQ.
SPORTS L. J. 207, 235 (1991).
151. EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN CLEM SMITH HAsKINs AD REGENTS OF THE
UNvERSriY OF MnqNESOTA (1992) (hereinafter Haskins' contract).
152. Selvaggi, supra note 147, at 226-27.
153. Greenberg, supra note 150, at 265.
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versity to terminate, suspend salary payments, or take other disciplinary
action if there is a determination by the university that the coach has
committed a major NCAA violation.'54 Just cause usually means a ma-
jor violation by the head coach, a major violation by a member of the
coaching staff that the head coach knew about, the conviction of a felony
by the head coach, a substantial failure to perform any of the duties
which are reasonable related to his duties, and multiple secondary viola-
tions.'5 5 In regards to just cause, the determination of whether a major
or secondary rule violation occurred usually requires a finding of the
governing association rather than the university. 56
A coach's contract may also give the university the right to terminate
the contract without just cause.' 57 Normally, the contract will have a
built-in provision for premature termination, without cause, outlining
the amount and method of payment. 5 8 However, some coaches' con-
tracts also contain a provision that allows a coach to be compensated
even if they are fired with just cause.159 For example, Clem Haskins'
contract contained a provision that paid him $423,000.00 in deferred
compensation even if he was terminated with just cause.' 60
One possible solution to hold coaches accountable for their viola-
tions of NCAA rules is for the university to bring a breach of contract
suit.1 61 The university could sue a coach for expectation damages. 62
Expectation damages, including consequential damages, would include
all revenue lost as a result of the NCAA sanctions imposed due to the
coach's violation of rules. 63 In order for the university to receive conse-
quential damages, the university must demonstrate: (1) the damages
were caused by the coach's breach of contract; (2) the amount of dam-
ages with a reasonable degree of certainty, and (3) the damages sus-
tained were within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the
agreement. 64
154. Id.
155. Id. at 265-67; HASKINS' CoNTRAcr, supra note 151.
156. HAsKINs' CorRAcr, supra note 151.
157. Greenberg, supra note 150, at 272.
158. Id.
159. Dennis Brackin & Randy Furst, Haskins Covered by Strong Contract, STAR TRM.
(Minneapolis), May 23, 1999, at lB.
160. Id.
161. Selvaggi, supra note 147, at 228.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 228-33.
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It is likely that a university would be able to fulfill this burden of
proof. 6 5 The university should be able to show that damages were
caused by the coach's violation of NCAA rules through the investigative
report. 66 Secondly, the university should be able to prove damages with
certainty by showing its lost television revenue or an inability to partici-
pate in post-season play. 67 Finally, it would seem obvious that both the
university and the coach could reasonably foresee that a violation of
NCAA rules would lead to penalties.168 Thus, a university may be able
to protect its economic interest by recovering consequential damages. 69
If a school would fail to establish the existence of damages, it still
may obtain a judgment for nominal damages. 7 ° Nominal damages re-
present a sum that is fixed without regard to the amount of harm.171
Although nominal damages may not fully compensate the university for
its financial harm, it will establish a precedent that coaches who violate
NCAA rules will be held accountable for their actions.
However, some universities could encounter a potential problem
when pursuing a contract action against a coach. Some states have stat-
utes that bar causes of action brought by regional collegiate athletic as-
sociations when an employee (i.e., coach) of a member institution
violates a rule. 72 Thus, in these locations, universities could not rely on
bringing suit against coaches.
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO A BREACH OF CoNTRAcr SUIT FOR HOLDING
COACHES AND STUDENT-ATHLETES ACCOUNTABLE
Since pursuing breach of contract actions against student-athletes
and coaches is a complex situation with various unknown consequences,
it is important to examine alternative possibilities that may address the
problem. The NCAA, coaches, legislators, and educators all have con-
tributed their recommendations to reform the current state of college
athletics) 73 Reform proposals include the use of state athlete-agent leg-
islation, a change in recruiting rules, paying student-athletes, restructur-
165. Id. at 235.
166. Selvaggi, supra note 147, at 228.
167. Id. at 229-31.
168. Id. at 232-33.
169. Id. at 233.
170. Id. at 234.
171. Russ VerSteeg, Slander & Slander Damages After Gertz and Dun & Bradstreet, 38
ViLL. L. REv. 655, 663 (1993).
172. TEx. Crv. PAc. & REM CODE ANN. §§131.003 & 131.005 (1999).
173. Moorman & Hums, supra note 8, at 171.
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ing coaching contracts, and a ban on legal gambling on college
athletics. 74 Thus, the following section will briefly discuss alternative
means of preventing harm to the universities' economic interests.
A. Athlete-Agent Legislation
The problems between athletes, agents, and universities have been
around for quite some time, and it does not appear that they will disap-
pear anytime soon. However, in an effort to address the problems cre-
ated by the unsavory practices of agents, many states have adopted
athlete-agent legislation. 175 Athlete-agent legislation has been imple-
mented to help protect universities' economic interests. Many legislators
believe that the legislation would help reduce or eliminate the chances of
universities being penalized by the NCAA and suffering financially.176
Currently there are twenty-eight states that have adopted some type
of athlete-agent legislation. 7 Penalties imposed upon agents for violat-
ing state athlete-agent legislation range from civil fines to criminal felony
charges.' 78 In addition, some states also impose civil and/or criminal lia-
bility on student-athletes. Civil remedies include restoring the injured
party to their previous position and compensating the victim for any
harm incurred. 79 Some states have expanded the scope of recovering
damages to include lost revenue from media coverage, lost revenue from
the forfeiture of athletic competition, and lost revenue from a ban of
post-season play.'80 Agents can also be subject to criminal penalties. In
Florida, for example, an agent who fails to comply with the state's regis-
tration requirements or engages in unlicensed agent activity is subject to
a third degree felony which could lead to imprisonment not exceeding
five years and/or a fine of up to $5,000.00.181
174. Andrew Bagnato, NCAA Exploring Ways to Fix College Basketball, TIMES-PIcA-
YUNE (NEW ORLEANS), Mar. 12, 2000, at C12; Michael O'Keeffe, Wagers Fuel NCAA's Fears:
Bill Would Ban Bets On Colleges, N.Y. DAILY NEWs, Mar. 12, 2000, at 26.
175. Moorman & Hums, supra note 8, at 172.
176. Don Walker, Legislation Proposed To Target Agents: Lawmaker Wants Protection for
Athletes and Schools, MILWAUKEE J. SENTIEL, Dec. 17, 1999, at 10.
177. Athlete Agent Laws By State, available at http://www.ncaa.org/agentsamateurism/
agents/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2000).
178. Moorman & Hums, supra note 8, at 168.
179. Linda S. Calvert Hanson, The Florida Legislature Revisits the Regulation and Liabil-
ity of Sports Agents and Student Athletes, 25 STETSON L. REv. 1067, 1080 (1996).
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Student-athletes can also be subject to liability for violating legisla-
tion. 82 For example, consider Auburn University basketball player
Chris Porter's recent involvement with a sports agent. 18 3 Porter admit-
ted accepting $2,500.00 from an agent and was subsequently declared
ineligible to participate in NCAA competition.' s However, under Ala-
bama's agent regulation law, it is possible that Porter could face further
legal action.'85 Alabama has a sports agent regulatory law that makes a
student-athlete who is convicted of a violation subject to a possible fine,
community service, or a damage lawsuit.' 6 The Alabama law provides
that student-athletes who enter into contracts with agents are subject to
the following penalty: "A student-athlete who negotiates for or enters
into an agent or professional sports services contract without giving the
required notice is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor and is subject to a
fine of not more than $1,000, and shall perform a minimum of 70 hours
of community service."187
Furthermore, Alabama law also provides that student-athletes who
accept extra "benefits without giving the required notice [are] liable to
the institution for actual damages that result from the loss of the stu-
dent's eligibility."' 88
Several other states have taken an aggressive approach to dealing
with illegal agent/athlete activity and other states are currently consider-
ing legislation similar to Alabama. 8 9 As a result, some universities have
a specific statutory remedy, an alternative to a breach of contract action,
to hold student-athletes accountable. 90 Furthermore, athlete-agent leg-
islation can also serve to protect nafve student-athletes, who are lured by
agents with the promises of wealth and glory.191 Therefore, the use of
athlete-agent legislation is an important step in providing a safeguard to
both student-athletes and universities. 92
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B. Changes in NCAA Recruiting Rules
The NCAA has proposed a change in the summer recruiting calendar
for men's basketball in the hopes of decreasing the chances of students
receiving extra benefits from AAU coaches, summer camp directors, and
agents. 193 Recently, many violations involving prospective student-ath-
letes receiving extra benefits from individuals with ties to agents prior to
enrolling in college have caused a great deal of disruption.194 For exam-
ple, St. John's University point guard, Erick Barkley, was suspended
twice during the season for receiving extra benefits. 95 His relationship
with a sports agent is still the focus of a NCAA investigation. 96 An-
other example includes UCLA forward, JaRon Rush, who was sus-
pended for receiving $6,325.00 from an individual with connections to
agents and a shoe company. 97
The summer recruiting period was used because it is more cost-effec-
tive for college coaches to evaluate the top high school prospects in a
few summer camps than to travel the country to see each player individ-
ually during the season.' 98 However, this reliance on summer recruiting
has led to an increase in NCAA violations.' 99 The NCAA is hoping the
changes in summer recruiting will help reduce the unwelcome influences
faced by student-athletes.20° Although this change could negatively af-
fect small universities with limited budgets who rely on the summer to
recruit, it may alleviate some of the problems of athletes receiving extra
benefits.20 1
C. Restructuring Coaches Contracts
Since universities may not desire to go to litigation as a result of hav-
ing to "air their dirty laundry" in a public proceeding, the need to
193. Ken Goe, NCAA Official Pushes for Culture Change, PORT'AN OREGONIAN, Mar.
31, 2000, at C7.
194. Scott M. Reid, Points of Contention: The NCAA is Taking a Hard Look at Poten-
tially Serious Problems That Plagued Men's Basketball This Season, THE ORANGE COUNTY
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restructure coaches' contracts is evident.2°2Coaches' contracts that allow
a coach to be paid even if they are terminated with "just cause" promote
an environment that tolerates unethical behavior.2°3 Removing this type
of clause from a coach's contract will send the message that coaches are
going to be held accountable for their role in NCAA violations.
D. Ban on Legal Gambling
Student-athlete involvement in gambling can not only threaten the
integrity of the game, but can also have a negative financial effect on
universities through investigation costs and financial sanctions.
A [1996] study by the University of Cincinnati of 648 Division I
Intercollegiate men's basketball and football respondents indi-
cated that 25.5% had gambled money on other college sporting
events, 3.7% had gambled money on a game in which they had
played, and 0.5% received money from a gambler for not playing
well in a game.20 4
These results have caused the NCAA and its member institutions to be
concerned with the integrity of intercollegiate athletics.2 05 Currently,
legislation is being proposed that would eliminate legal gambling in Las
Vegas.20 6 The NCAA believes that this proposed legislation will aid in
preserving the integrity of college sporting events and assist in protecting
student-athletes from pressures to influence the outcome of a game or
contest.
207
However, the gambling industry will not give up the approximately
$1 billion that is wagered on college sports each year in Las Vegas with-
out a fight.208 Some people believe that the elimination of legal betting
will only make the sports betting problem worse by putting it under-
ground.20 9 Nevertheless, at worst, a ban on legal gambling can only help
increase the integrity of the game, increase the likelihood that student-
202. Rick Linsk, Contract Gives Coach Clem Haskins Lofty Severance Package; Coach
Compensated Even if Minnesota Can Justify Removing From Job, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS,
June 11, 1999, at Sports, 1.
203. Greenberg, supra note 150, at 265.
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athletes will not bet on games, and help out the public image of an or-
ganization that desperately needs support.
VII. CONCLUSION
The relationship between a university and a student-athlete repre-
sents a binding contract. Universities have access to a valid legal claim, a
means to recovering financial losses, and an important mechanism to es-
tablish a precedent of holding unethical student-athletes accountable.
However, filing a lawsuit against a student-athlete also comes with many
possible consequences. Institutions must realize that there are many po-
litical, social, and public relations issues that may negatively affect the
university if it decides to pursue a contract action against a student-ath-
lete. In addition to a contract claim, universities have several alterna-
tives that may allow them to hold student-athletes accountable and to
maintain a level of institutional control.
The time has come to treat student-athletes and coaches as adults
and require a minimum level of accountability. One corrupt student-
athlete or coach can set an athletic program back for years and unques-
tionably damage the reputation and finances of the university for several
years. However, universities do not have to sit back idly while student-
athletes and coaches run afoul of NCAA regulations. The choice to pur-
sue a contract action resides with the university. Nonetheless, universi-
ties must take further steps to protect themselves from the unethical
behavior of student-athletes, agents, and coaches.
KEviN STANGEL
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